The prospect of securing EU funding and a "better understanding" between Cyprus and Turkey are judged as significant factors for achieving the construction of the East Med natural gas pipeline, which would link deposits exploited in the east Mediterranean with west European markets.
By V. Kostoulas
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The prospect of securing EU funding and a "better understanding" between Cyprus and Turkey are judged as significant factors for achieving the construction of the East Med natural gas pipeline, which would link deposits exploited in the east Mediterranean with west European markets.
Israeli analysts well versed with the Netanyahu government's energy policy directly referred to these two factors in comments to "N" last month, while adding that the proven energy reserves comprise a valuable took in exercising policy in the wider region.
The proposed East Med project, officially known as the Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline, is judged as an extremely challenging endeavor in terms of construction and technological specifications. As previously reported, the plan is to connect the Leviathan deposit in Israeli waters via an underwater pipeline that first reaches Cyprus. The pipeline would then extend from Cyprus to Crete, then on through the Greek mainland - from south to north - before again taking an underwater route westwards towards the Italian coast across the Adriatic.
Based on initial estimates, such a pipeline would have annual capacity of 10 billion cubic meters, with the possibility of reaching 16 billion cubic meters. The biggest part of the planned pipeline, extending over 1,900 kilometers, would be underwater and up to a depth of three kilometers. If built, the pipeline would be the deepest in the world.
Nevertheless, high-ranking political sources in Israel told "N" that this project cannot proceed without EU funding, as well as an improvement in the complex and highly problematic relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. That "relationship", in fact, doesn't even exist on an official bilateral basis, given that Turkey doesn't recognize the Republic of Cyprus, instead recognizing a Turkish Cypriot pseudo-state that it props up in the 37 percent of the island republic that Ankara illegally occupies with its military.
Although another pipeline connecting the Israeli deposits with mainland Turkey is on the "drawing board", prickly relations between Israel and Turkey's Erdogan-dominated governments over recent years render this prospect as remote.
One primary advantage entailed in an east Mediterranean pipeline reaching western Europe - and one that bypasses Turkey - is that this project would boost Europe's diversification in terms of natural gas supplies, a standing Commission goal.
Conversely, other top Israeli energy analysts and executives expressed reservations over the high price tag for such a project, and warned that it is also not a priority for the Union. An alternate and more realistic scenario, proponents of this reasoning argue, is for Israel to build its own LNG facilities on its own territory, and possibly another facility on government-controlled Cyprus (Vassilikos site).
That would mean exporting liquefied natural gas via tankers to other markets.