Thursday's EWG session, the first of 2017, will apparently indicate whether the leftist Greek government's optimism over a successful completion of negotiations for a second review of the Greek program (third bailout) -- by a scheduled Jan. 26 Eurogroup meeting -- are realistic.
By N. Bellos
Thursday's EWG session, the first of 2017, will apparently indicate whether the leftist Greek government's optimism over a successful completion of negotiations for a second review of the Greek program (third bailout) -- by a scheduled Jan. 26 Eurogroup meeting -- are realistic.
Nevertheless, even the usually upbeat Commission -- which pointed to December 2016 "completion" dates previously -- appears to defer to a conclusion in February, meaning an additional delay in unblocking the latest round of bailout loans.
Along those lines, a spokeswoman for EU Commissioner Pierre Moscovici last week avoided referring to a completion of negotiations by Jan. 26, instead citing an overall assessment of the situation.
The last time the EuroWorking Group convened before Christmas coincided with creditors' concerns over a snap announcement by the Greek government of a "holiday bonus" to roughly 1.6 million pensioners receiving 850 euros in monthly social security payments. One of the criticisms publicly aired at the time was the fact that the Tsipras government failed to previously consult with creditors over the measure, something that Greek FinMin Euclid Tsakalotos promised won't occur again in a Christmas Eve letter to Eurogroup chairman Jeroen Dijsselbloem.
Nevertheless, sources in Brussels have stressed that the spending measure, announced in a televised address by the Greek prime minister no less, delayed the process by at least two weeks, with creditors at one point even freezing the implementation of short-term debt relief measures (set for this month) previously agreed to for the Greek debt.
The dawn of 2017 for the sputtering Greek program began where 2016 left off, with all eyes on the positions of the IMF and Berlin and resolution of their differences over the bailout. Such as resolution would ostensibly aim to keep the Fund involved in the Greek program as a creditor, but without forcing the leftist Greek government to legislate more fiscal measures after the current program ends in 2018.
"Fiscal measures" in this case means guarantees that primary budget surplus targets of 3.5 percent of GDP after 2018 will be met.